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The current age of globalization can be 
distinguished from the previous one (from 1870 
to 1914) by the much higher mobility of capital 
than labor (in the previous age. before 
immigration restrictions, labor was at least as 
mobile as capital). This increased mobility has 1 
been the result of technological changes (the 2 
ability to move funds electronically). and the 
relaxation of exchange controls. The mobility of j 
capital has led to tax competition. in which $ 
sovereign countries lower their tax rates on I 
income earned by foreigners within their 
borders in order to attract both portfolio and 
direct investment. Tax competition, in turn, 
threatens to undermine the individual and 
corporate income taxes, which remain major 
sources of revenue (in terms of percentage of 
total revenue collected) for all modern states. 
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The response of both developed and 
developing countries to these 
developments has been first, to shift the tax 
burden from (mobile) capital to (less 
mobile) labor, and second, when further 
increased taxation of labor becomes 
politically and economically difficult, to cut 
government services. Thus, globalization 
and tax competition lead to a fiscal crisis 
for countries that wish to continue to 
provide those government services to their 
citizens, at the same time that demographic 
factors and the increased income inequality, 
job insecurity, and income volatility that 
result from globalization render such 
services more necessary. 
From its beginnings late in the 19th 
century, the modem state has been 
financed primarily by progressive income 
taxation. The income tax differs from other 
forms of taxation (such as consumption or 
social security taxes) in that in theory it 
includes income from capital in the tax 
base, even if it is saved and not consumed. 
Because the rich save more than the poor, a 
tax that includes income from capital in its 
base is more progressive (taxes the rich 
more heavily) than a tax that excludes 
income from capital (e.g., a consumption 
tax or a payroll tax). However, the ability to 
tax saved income from capital (i.e., income 
not vulnerable to consumption taxes) is 
impaired if the capital can be shifted 
overseas to jurisdictions where it escapes 
taxation. 
Two recent developments have 
dramatically augmented the ability of both 
individuals and corporations to earn 
income overseas free of income taxation: 
the effective end of withholding taxation 
by developed countries, and the rise of 
production tax havens in developing 
countries. Since the United States abolished 
its withholding tax on interest paid to 
foreigners in 1984, no major capital 
importing country has been able to impose 
such a tax for fear of driving mobile capital 
elsewhere (or increasing the cost of capital 
for domestic borrowers, including the 
government itself). The result is that 
individuals can generally earn investment 
income free of host country taxation in any. 
of the world's major economies. Moreover, 
even developed countries find it 
exceedingly difficult to effectively collect 
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lobalization and tax 
com~etition lead to a fiscal crisis and * 
decade, competition for inbou for countries that wish to continue investment has led an increasin 01 I 
to provide those government countries (103, as of 1998) to oIfer rax I 
s e ~ c e s  to their citizens, at the holidays specifically geared to foreign 
same time that demographic corporate investors. Given the relative ease with which an integrated multinational can 
and the increased income shift production facilities in response to tax 
inequality, job insecurity, and rates, such "production tax havens" enable 
income that result from multinationals to derive most of their 
income abroad free of host country 
globalization render such ,tion. Moreover, most developed 
more necessary. countries (including the United States) 
not dare impose current taxation (or 
sometimes any taxation) on the foreign 
the tax on the foreign income of their source business income of their resident 
individual residents in the absence of multinationals, for fear of reducing the:{T7 
wthholding taxes imposed by host competitiveness of those multinational8 A ?. 
countries, because the investments can be against mult~nationals of other countries if 
made through tax havens with strong bank they did. new multinationals could be set 
secrecy laws. Developing countries, with up as residents of jurisdictions that do not 
much weaker tax administrations, find t h i p  tax such foreign M U ~  income. Thus, .Y 
task almost impossible. Thus, cross-border& busin- i n ~ m  a be dtbroa- 
investment income can largely be earned largely free of either host or h m e  countr) 
free of either host or home country taxation. 
t m a t i o ~ $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ ~ d m ~  S'L For example: Intel Corporation, a top 
For example, consider a wealthy 10 multinational, has operations in more 
Mexican who wishes to earn tax-free than 30 countries around the globe. The 
interest income from investing in the bonds company states that " [aIn Intel chip 
of an American corporation. All he needs developed at a design center in Oregon 
to do is set up, for a nominal fee, a might be manufactured at a wafer 
Cayman Islands corporation to hold the fabrication facility in Ireland, packaged and 
bonds. The interest payments are then tested in Malaysia, and then sold to a 
made to the Caymans corporation without customer in Australia. Another chip might 
any U.S. tax withheld under the so-called be designed in Japan, fabricated in israel, 
"portfolio interest exemption" (Internal packaged and tested in Anzona, and sold 
Revenue Code section 87 101)). The in China." Specifically, outside the United 
mdividual does not report the income to States, Intel has malor manufacturing 
the Mefican tax authorities, and they have facilities in Pueno hco. China, Malaysia. 
no way of knowing that the Caymans the Philippines, Ireland, and Israel. Thus, 
corporation is effectively an "incorporated outside the United States, all of Intel5 
pocketbook" of the Mexican resident. Nor manufacturing facilities are located in 
are the exchange of information provisions countries granting tax hol lda~s~ Nor does 
of the U.S.-Mexico tax treaty of any help, Intel pay current U.5  tax on its i~~come 
because the IRS has no way of knowing from those foreign operations, because 
that the recipient of the interest payments under U.5 law, active income a m e d  by 
is controlled by a Mexican resident and foreign subsidiaries of U. S. multinationals 
therefore cannot report this to the Mexican is not taxed untll it is repatriated in the 
authorities. As a result, the income is foim of dividends, whch Intel can delay 
earned completely free of tax (the for inany years. Thus, the effective tax rate 
Qyrnam, of course, impose no income on  Intel's foreign source lncome IS far 
taxes of their om).  below the nominal US. corporate rate of 
When we switch our attention from 5 pemnt. , 
passive to producrive in-ent, a $rmkr . . 
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If income from apiM can crepe the 
incorn taaz M, tbe tax becams irr edect a 
tax on kbo~  SeveraE: empirical studies 
in ELn mgg=t.eXE that ia xnne develop 
jurisdictions the effective tax rate on 
incame from ~npiial approaches zao, and 
tax ram on c8pim1 LWC tended m go 
d m  shmplp since the eady 1980s fwha 
m g e  c ~ ~ t m b  were nWj5 As a 
-5 cozantrks that used to mly on the 
wvenues b m  the income tax are forad ra 
incr~ase datheEp regressive ~axes. 
Ihe f a s ~ p * g  taxes in OECD 
' (Orgmkati8~$ for 0rem~rni~- Chpratia1;& 
and Dwebpmentl m&r w a l i ~ a  in
recent pars have becn ~onxrngtion taxes 
(h 12 percent of taal m u m  in 1969 
to 18 pemmt in 1995) and papdl taxes 
(from 19 percent ro 21 pexem3, both oL 
which are morr regmisite than rhe tncome: 
' tax. e e r  chc b e  period, the p e a u ~ i  
md c o p m e  haxae-mes have not 
g'own as a pmnmge of total r e m w  
' fdhe parsad bmme tax a(c:c~urt.te$ fbr 26 
p e m t  of total revenues iin E965 and ZT 
percent in 1995, while rhc @rm for thc 
a q ~ r a f e .  income rn are 9 peEene 4 $3 . 
pmnt respeedveiyl. The bx menaxe 
as a pemmtagc d G D P  [ G m  Dmwstic 
Roducr) tn &v&:Iqigtd munada wma up 
sharply during rho m e  period f f m  an 
average of 28 p a e a t  in X969 lo aknost 
40 pesent in f 9%3, md &is increase k 
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TAX COMPETITION AND THE 
OEYELOPING COUNTRIES 
The drawbacks sf tax competition for 
developed countries are relatively clear. 
because such countries have am elaborate 
social insurance safety net that requires a 
hgh level of government expenditure and 
that is threatened by tax competition. But 
how does tax competition affect developing 
countdes7 
Eirst, it should be pointed out that 
developing emntfie need the reyenues at 
least as much as dewloped countties do, if 
not more. A common m i ~ ~ e r c ~ ~ t i o n  is that 
only OECD member countries are 
codr~nted by a h a 1  crisis as a result of 
the increasing numbers of elderly people in 
the population. lnhct, the increase in 
dependency ratios (the ratio of the elderly 
to the worki~~opulat iun) is expected to 
take place in other geo'graphic areas as 
well, as fertility rates go down and health 
care improves. Outside the OECD and the 
transition economies, the dependency ratio 
starts in the single digits in the 199Qs, bwr 
rbes to just below 30 percent by 2 MI. 
Mo~over, while outside the OECD md h e  
transition economics direct spending on 
social insurance is mush 2mer, other form 
of govemunent spending ce.g., government 
empb~ent , ]  efiectivety fulfill a social 
insurance mle. In Latin h e r b ,  for 
example, direct government spending on 
mcid insurance is much lower than , 
indirect spending through government 
mnplapent and procurement prqp-ams." 
Mare~ver, it seems arang t a . a r p  that 
dqek~piing cotinaria need tax revenues kss 
than developed cmntries because they 
b v e  less developed social insurance 
pr6pm. If one acGep the nonnative 
case for social insurance, it appf 1 1es to 
developing countries with even greater 
force because of vdespread povertyli wtuch 
meam that Posing a job can have much 
moxe dire consequences. h t  the need for 
revenus in developing counnies goes lar 
kpd social iimme. In some 
developing countr i~  rwmw me needed 
to imure Lhe very swvbaE of organired 
g m m e n t ,  as the Russian eqxrience 
demonstrates. In other, more stable 
developing countries, revenues are needed 
to provide for adequate 
education (investment in human capital), 
which many regard as the key to 
promoting development. For example, the 
UN has estimated that for only $30-$40 
billion, all people in the world can obtain 
basic social services (such as elementary 
education). Given current trends in foreign 
aid, most of these funds have to come from 
developing country governments. 
Second, the standard advice by 
economists to small open economies is that 
they should refrain from taxing foreign 
investors, because such investors cannot be 
made to bear the burden of any tax 
imposed by the capital importing country 
Therefore, the tax will necessarily be 
shifted to less mobile factors in the host 
country, such as labor andlor land, and it is 
more efficient to tax those factors directly 
But while this argument seems quite valid 
as applied to portfolio investment, it seems 
less valid in regard to FDI (foreign direct 
investment, i.e., investment by 
multinational enterprises), for two reasons. 
First, the standard advice does not apply if 
a foreign tax credit is available in the home 
country of the investor, which frequently 
would be the case for FDI. Second, the 
standard advice assumes that the host 
country is small. However, an extensive 
literature on mu1 tinationals suggests that 
typically they exist in order to earn 
economic rents. In that case, the host 
country is no longer "small" in the 
economic sense. That is, there is a reason 
for the investor to be there and not 
elsewhere. Therefore, any tax imposed on 
such rents (as long as it is below 100 
percent) will not necessarily drive the 
investor to leave even if it is unable to shift 
the burden of the tax to labor or 
landowners. 
This argument clearly holds in the case 
of rents that are linked to a specific 
location, such as natural resources or a 
large market. But what if the rent can be 
earned in a large number of potential 
locations? In this case, the host country 
will not be able to tax the rent if the 
multinational can credibly threaten to go 
elsewhere, although once the investment 
situation, which is probably the most 
common, would require coordinated action 
to enable all host countries to tax the rent 
earned within their borders. Some 
possibilities for such action are described 
below. This relates to the final argument, 
which is that host countries need to offer 
tax incentives to be competitive. An 
extensive literature has demonstrated that 
taxes do in fact play a crucial role in 
determining investment location decisions. 
But all of these studies emphasize that the 
tax incentives are crucial given the 
availahlity of such incentives elsewhere. Thus, 
it can be argued that given the need for tax 
revenues, developing countries would in 
general prefer to refrain from granting tax 
incentives, if only they could be assured 
that no other developing country would be 
able to grant such incentives. 
Thus, restricting the ability of 
developing countries to compete in 
granting tax incentives does not truly 
restrict their autonomy or counter their 
interests. That is the case whenever they 
grant the incentive only for fear of 
competition from other developing 
countries, and would not have granted it 
but for such fear. Whenever competition 
from other countries drives the tax 
incentive, eliminating the competition does 
not hurt the developing country, and may 
aid its revenue raising efforts (assuming it 
can attract investment on other grounds, 
which is typically the case). Moreover, 
under the proposals described below, 
developing countries remain free to lower 
their tax rates generally (as opposed to 
granting specific tax relief aimed at foreign 
investors). 
Two additional points need to be made 
from a developing country perspective. The 
first concerns the question of tax incidence. 
Since the tax competition that is most 
relevant to developing countries concerns 
the corporate income tax, it is important to 
attempt to assess the incidence of that tax 
in evaluating the effects of collecting it on 
the welfare of the developing country 
Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no 
consensus exists on the incidence of the 
corporate tax. While the older studies have 
tended to conclude that the tax is borne by 
shareholders or by all capital providers, 
ggested that the 
tax is borne to a significant extent by 
consumers or by labor. Another possibility 
is that the tax on established corporations 
was borne by those who were shareholders 
at the time the tax was imposed or 
increased, because thereafter it is 
capitalized into the price of the shares. It is 
unlikely that this debate will be decided 
any time soon (in fact, the incidence may 
be shlfting over time, especially as 
globalization may enable corporations to 
shift more of the tax burden to labor). 
However, from the perspective of a 
developing country deciding whether to 
collect taxes from a multinational, three out 
of the four possible alternatives for 
incidence (current shareholders or capital 
providers, old shareholders, and 
consumers) are largely the residents of 
other jurisdictions, and therefore from a 
national welfare perspective the developing 
country gains by collecting the tax. And 
even if some of the tax is shifted to labor in 
the developing country, it can be argued 
that as a matter of tax administration it is 
more efficient (as well as more politically 
acceptable) to collect the tax from the 
multinational than to attempt to collect it 
from the workers. 
Finally, it should be noted that a 
developing country may want to collect 
taxes from multinationals even if in general 
it believes that the private sector is more 
efficient in using the resources than the 
public sector. That is because in the case of 
a foreign multinational, the taxes that the 
developing country fails to collect may 
indeed be used by the private sector, but in 
another jurisdiction, and therefore not 
benefit the developing country. One 
possible solution, which is in fact 
employed by developing countries, is to 
refrain from taxing multinationals while 
they re-invest domestically, but tax them 
upon remittance of the profits abroad. 
However, such taxation of dividends and 
other forms of remittance is subject to thf 
same tax competition problem that we 
discussed above. Thus, it would appear 
that overcoming the tax competition 
problem is in most cases in the interest 01 
developing countries, and the question 
remains how to do so in the face of the 
collective action problem described abovt 
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reintroduced the withholding tax on t can be argued that given 
interest, but made it inapplicable to non- the need for tax revenues, 
residents. Non-residents may however, be 
Germans investing through Luxembourg developing countries would in 
bank accounts. To cope with h problem, general prefer to refrain from 
the Germans have led an EU effort to granting tax incentives, if only 
introduce a 20 percent withholding tax on they could be assured that no 
other developing country would be 
investors from abroad to gain the revenue, United Kingdom have SO far blocked the able to grant such incentives. 
but is afraid that by doing so it would drive adoption of this plan, arguing that it will 
the investors to other jurisdictions that do lead to a flight of investors to Switzerland 
not tax them. If there wen: a wiy t or the United States. 
coordinate actions among the relevan Thus, the key to finding a solution to 
jurisdictions, they all could gain added the tax competition problem is to attack it 
revenues without running the risk of losing on a broad multilateral basis, though an 
organization such as the OECD. Under 
A epod illunation df how this dynamic current conditions, the OECD is the 
works is the h s t o l y l  G e m  taxation of natural choice for leading such c o o r h t e d  
interat income. 1n11988, Germany actions against tax competition, for three 
intr~adwd a 10, percent withholding tax reasons. First, for individual investors to 
on interesr paid ts bank depositors, but 
had to abolish it within a few months 
because of the magnitude of capital fli 
ta ~ w m b o u r g .  In 1991, the Eem havens do not oEer adequate investment 
Camtitutional Court he1 opportunities, and deireloping countries are 
ding taxes on wag= bug generally considered too risky for portfolio 
violated the constiruti~na investment Cother than through mutual 
The ~wemment hereunun hnds, which do nut offer tax avoidance 
ov~ortunitiesl. Thus. if all OECD members 
' ' C  - 
_r _ -  
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:%doma t xation of p ~ n ~ o u o  investment, it Dependmg m h e  O E D  for solving the 
atd be mbject to tax without requiring tax campetitim pmb1em su@em fmm one 
operatjon from the tax havms. major drawback Developing countries a= 
Second, about 85 pment of the worlds left out, and may perceive actians by the 
a -  _ -,, 1'- 3 nab are headquartered in OECD OECD as a artel of rich countries 
member countries. This is likely to operating at their expense. In fact, as 
continue to be the ease for a while, because pointed out above, it is unlikely that tax 
OECD members offer stable corporate and competition benefits developing count~ies~ 
securities law protection to investors that is who can also use the tax revenues they @ve - , 
beking in other countries. Thus, if all up to attract foreign investors. If an 
O W  members agreed on a coordinated - developing countTies could be prevented 
basis to tax their multinationals currently from competing in this fashion, they all 
on their income from abroad, most of the could gain. But in the longer run, it m y  be 
problem of tax competition from direct better to enuust the fight against harmful 
investment could be solved. tax competition to the W O ,  in whlch 
Third, the OECD has the required dweloping countries are adequately Raven S. Avi-YODab earned his B A  
expertise (its model tax treaty is the global ~pmented.  This would also solve the in history, summa cum hude, fjpm 
smdad) and has already started on the problem of what to do about the 15 
path of limiting tax competition. In 1998, perrent of multinationals who are not Hebm University, a d  t h  cont ind  
it adopted a report entitled Harmfil Tax headquartered in OECD member countries his &cation at H m d  University. 
Cornpetitian. An Emerging Global Issue. This (a percentage that can be expected to grow VltimateZy, he meived t h m  degrees 
report is somewhat limited, because it only if the OECD indked moves to resnict tax @m Harvard. an AM in history, a 
addresses tax competition for b & l  competition for its multinatio&)- Ph.D. in history, and aJ.D., m a p  
activities and services (as opposed to, e.g., To sum up: As a result of globalization cum laude, from H m d  haw School. 
Intel!! manufacturing plants). It also does and tax competition, tax rules can no Professor Avi-YonaJ3S teaching 
not address the taxation of investment longer be set by countries acting experience is extensive. Before joining 
income. But it represents an dmmely unilaterally or by bilateral tax treaties. In a the p a m m t f m l t y  the Uni-0 
useful firststep, and proof that a consensus world in which capital can move kely  of Michigun Law School, he had h a 
can be reached on the tax competition across national borders and multinationals visiting pmfessor of law at the 
issue. (Switzerland and Luxembourg - are free to choose among many investment University ofMichigan Law Schoot and 
abstained, but did not dare veto the locations, the ability of any one country the Univenify of Pennsylvania He dso 
adoption of the report by the other (or any two countries in cooperation) to Fwxs served as an assistant pfessar of 
27 members of the OECD.) tax (or otherwise regulate) such capita1 is law at Hamad Lsw School and as an 
The OECD makes a useful dstinction severely limited. Any such unilateral assistant professor of history cat Boston 
between tax competition in the form of attempt will be undercut by other College. In addition, he has p r d c c h  
generally applicable lower tax rates, and countries, and will probably not even be law with Milbank, Tweed, H d e y  & 
tax regimes designed to attract foreign attempted in the name of preserving MKZoy, New York; Wachtell, Lipton, 
investors. This distinction is both national competitiveness. Thus, a Rosen & New Yor-k; and Ropes G, 
nonnatively and pragmatically sound: multilateral solution is essential if the Gray, Boston; and has co-chtlired 
Restricting tax competition should not ana fundamental goals of taxation or other 
cannot mean that voters in democratic several committees of tke Nau York regulation are to be preserved. Private 
countries lose their right to determine the market activities that span the globe can State Bar Ti Section a d  served as 
size of the public sector through general only be regulated or taxed by organizations member of the U.S. Income Ad\riso 
tax incfeases or reductions. But it does with a similar global reach. 
v a n  that countries should not provide 
windfalls for foreign investors at the Yonah isfluent in Fmch, German, and 
expense of the ability of other countries to Hebm, a d  r e d  in Arabic, Gmk ,  
provide those public services their Italian, Latin, Portuguese, d Spanish. 
residents desire. Such limitations are His teaching i n t m f o c u s  on vmious 
panicular1y appropriate because those aspects of tux&on and multinutional 
foreign investors themselves often reside in enterprise. He has written extensively 
cauntries providing a hq& level of services, on national and intmational tux 
and yet refuse to pay the tax price that issues. Professay Avi-Ya&S research 
1 providing such services entails. amenfly f o w s  on the interaction of 
tax and trude lm 
